CVE Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: fnic: Use GFP_ATOMIC for VLAN alloc under spinlock fnic_fcoe_process_vlan_resp() allocates a VLAN descriptor with kzalloc_obj() (default GFP_KERNEL) while holding vlans_lock via spin_lock_irqsave(). GFP_KERNEL may sleep, which is not allowed in this atomic context and can trigger a sleeping-from-invalid-context warning or deadlock. Pass GFP_ATOMIC so the allocation is safe under the IRQ-safe spinlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RISC-V: KVM: Fix PMU event info array size overflow SBI PMU EVENT_GET_INFO stores guest-controlled num_events * sizeof(*einfo) in a 32-bit integer. On RV64, num_events = 0x10000001 makes 0x100000010 truncate to 16. KVM then allocates one entry but loops over the original num_events, causing out-of-bounds reads and writes. A nested guest triggered: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 Read of size 4 at addr ff600000074d46b0 by task init/1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8006471c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0xa4/0x142 [<ffffffff800690c0>] kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 [<ffffffff8006779e>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 [<ffffffff8006008c>] kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 [<ffffffff8005ea0a>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 Allocated by task 1: __kmalloc_noprof+0x19e/0x4b0 kvm_riscv_vcpu_pmu_event_info+0x72/0x142 kvm_sbi_ext_pmu_handler+0xca/0x268 kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_ecall+0xec/0x1e6 kvm_riscv_vcpu_exit+0x48c/0x540 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x37e/0xc80 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 16-byte region [ff600000074d46a0, ff600000074d46b0) Store the shared-memory size in size_t and reject multiplication overflow. Allocate the guest-driven array with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT so it is charged to kmemcg, and use __GFP_NOWARN to suppress allocation failure warnings. Use kvcalloc() to allow vmalloc fallback and an unsigned long loop index to match num_events.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: scp: Fix device reference leak on failed lookup Make sure to drop the reference taken to the SCP device when attempting to look up its driver data before the driver has been bound. Note that holding a reference to a device does not prevent its driver data from going away.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qede: Fix NULL pointer dereference in TPA fragment processing Under memory pressure, the qede driver encounters NULL pointer dereferences when processing TPA continuation fragments. Commit 8a8633978b84 ("qede: Add build_skb() support.") accidentally dropped the assignment of tpa_info->buffer.data in qede_tpa_start(). When memory pressure causes an SKB allocation failure in qede_tpa_start(), the driver sets tpa_start_fail = true and attempts to recycle the physical page later in qede_tpa_end() via qede_reuse_page(). However, because buffer.data was left uninitialized (NULL), qede_reuse_page() pushes a "ghost" BD (valid DMA mapping but NULL data pointer) back into the active Rx ring. The next time the hardware uses this ring slot, it passes a NULL page to qede_fill_frag_skb(), causing a kernel panic. Example crash from production system: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x8 RIP: qede_fill_frag_skb+0x96/0x430 [qede] Call Trace: qede_rx_int+0xb06/0x1de0 qede_poll+0x2f4/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0x2d/0x130 Fix the root cause by restoring the tpa_info->buffer.data assignment in qede_tpa_start(), ensuring valid pages are correctly tracked and recycled. Additionally, update the stale comment for struct qede_agg_info::buffer to reflect its current usage.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cxgb4: Cancel reg_work before freeing device on remove c4iw_uld_state_change() queues reg_work to register the RDMA device. c4iw_remove() can free ctx->dev while this work is pending or running, leaving c4iw_register_device() accessing the freed device. Cancel reg_work before removing the device. The registration work can tear down ctx->dev when registration fails, so do not unregister or deallocate it again in that case. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ionic: Embed counter driver data in rdma_counter allocation Commit 7e53b31acc7f ("RDMA/core: Create and destroy rdma_counter using rdma_zalloc_drv_obj()") requires drivers implementing counter ops to embed struct rdma_counter in a driver-specific struct, register its size via INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE, and provide a counter_init callback. The ionic driver was merged without this adaptation, causing a NULL pointer dereference in alloc_and_bind() since rdma_zalloc_drv_obj() allocates zero bytes when size_rdma_counter is unset. Consolidate struct ionic_counter into a new struct ionic_rdma_counter that embeds struct rdma_counter, replace the xarray with a lightweight ida for ID allocation, and add the required counter_init and INIT_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE declarations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_set_ib_path() ucma_set_ib_path() calls ucma_event_handler() straight from the write() path, without the handler lock that keeps ctx->file stable while a uevent is queued. The handler re-reads ctx->file for every dereference: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ A concurrent ucma_migrate_id() reassigns ctx->file while the SET_OPTION caller sleeps in mutex_lock(), so the list_add_tail() lands on file B's event_list while only file A's mutex is held, racing every other user of that list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888153c6a418 by task poc_corr/486 Call Trace: __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 ucma_event_handler+0x1be/0xc00 ucma_set_ib_path+0x45e/0x710 ucma_set_option+0x32e/0x590 ucma_write+0x1f9/0x330 Allocated by task 505: ucma_write_cm_event+0x1a1/0x660 Freed by task 505: kfree+0x1da/0x4c0 ucma_get_event+0x5d5/0x7e0 The freed object is a ucma_event that another thread dequeued from file B's list under file B's mutex. File A's mut is left held on top of that, wedging its next writer in uninterruptible sleep. This path needs a bound and address-resolved cm_id, so it requires an RDMA device to be present. Take the handler lock around the call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_write_cm_event() ctx->file may only be changed under the handler lock and the xa_lock, which is what stops uevents being queued for a ctx while ucma_migrate_id() moves it to another file. The CM core takes that lock before invoking ucma_event_handler(), but the write() paths that queue uevents themselves do not. ucma_write_cm_event() re-reads ctx->file for each of its four dereferences, so ucma_migrate_id() can swap it mid-sequence: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ The window is the mutex_lock() itself: the writer sleeps in it while the migration reassigns ctx->file. The list_add_tail() then runs on file B's event_list holding only file A's mutex: list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff888101320f30), but was ffff88814a08c418. (prev=ffff88814a075c18). kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:32! Call Trace: ucma_write_cm_event+0x36e/0x5e0 and file A's mut is left held forever, wedging its next writer in D state. The uevent is also stranded on a list ucma_cleanup_ctx_events() will not walk, so it outlives its context. /dev/infiniband/rdma_cm is 0666 and no RDMA device is involved, so an unprivileged user reaches all of this. Take the handler lock, as ucma_cleanup_mc_events() does; ctx->cm_id is pinned by the ucma_get_ctx() reference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/uverbs: Add UVERBS_ATTR_UHW to UVERBS_METHOD_REG_MR The original commit missed that three drivers (mthca, irdma, siw) have UHW data associated with reg_mr that cannot be passed through the ioctl. They also assume that the udata cannot be NULL, so failing to pass a valid udata can trigger a NULL udata crash in those drivers. This never happens in real systems since in rdma-core ibv_cmd_reg_mr_ex() does not accept a udata and those three drivers don't use it, however a malicious userspace could trigger it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/uverbs: Guard legacy bundles without method_elm The legacy write() path dispatches through a uverbs_api_write_method, but the uverbs_attr_bundle passed to provider code does not have an ioctl method element. If malformed provider input causes the common uverbs validation code to emit an error message, uverbs_get_handler_fn() dereferences the uninitialized method_elm pointer. Initialize method_elm explicitly for legacy bundles and make uverbs_get_handler_fn() return NULL when no ioctl method is present. The legacy dispatcher continues to use its local write method, while the ioctl path continues to use the registered ioctl handler.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: as3722_get_regulator_dt_data: fix premature of_node_put leaving dangling of_node pointer In as3722_get_regulator_dt_data(), of_get_child_by_name() acquires a reference on np, which is then assigned to pdev->dev.of_node. The function immediately calls of_node_put(np), releasing the reference and leaving pdev->dev.of_node as a dangling pointer. Remove the of_node_put(np) call to let the device hold the reference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix subbuf resize race with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() is racy with ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set, it can allocate a reader page with an outdated order. This isn't a big issue, the user can still re-allocate a new reader page and try again. However, what is more problematic is if the value of subbuf_order changes in the middle of ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(). In that case, bpage->order might not match the actual allocated memory. Use bpage->order for the allocation to prevent this race.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Free cpu_buffer::free_page with subbuf_order When sub-buffers use an order greater than 0, cpu_buffer->free_page is allocated with subbuf_order. Use the correct order for cpu_buffer->free_page.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Hold cpu_buffer::lock when resizing a subbuf Because, ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() can clear cpu_buffer->free_page, hold cpu_buffer->lock to prevent races with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() and ring_buffer_free_read_page().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Make cpu_buffer::free_page a buffer_data_read_page Discarding a cached reader page after a concurrent ring buffer resize uses the new global subbuf_order for the free_pages() call. This mismatched order may crashes the kernel or leaks memory because the cached page was allocated under the old size. Save the actual free_page order alongside the page address to ensure we always refer to the correct value and do not rely on the potentially stalled cpu_buffer->subbuf_order value. The simplest is to make free_page a buffer_data_read_page which already covers exactly what we need: a page address and a page order.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails The remote swap_reader_page callback can return -EBUSY when the writer moves the head before the remote catches it, particularly during an event storm on a small buffer. __rb_get_reader_page_from_remote() currently warns about that failure but continues with the unchanged reader ID and rearranges the local page list as though the swap succeeded. Handle the callback failure as a recoverable error. Report it with pr_warn_ratelimited() and return NULL. Callers already handle a NULL reader page as a failed attempt. This avoids splicing the same page as both the previous and new reader without flooding the log under contention.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: fix double-free of trailer_buf on readdir copy failure On a readdir downcall, orangefs_devreq_write_iter() frees op->downcall.trailer_buf with vfree() when copy_from_iter_full() fails, but does not clear the pointer before goto Efault. The waiter in do_readdir() is then woken with a negative status and frees the same pointer again on its r < 0 path, causing a deterministic double-free. A client holding /dev/pvfs2-req triggers it by sending a readdir downcall whose declared trailer_size exceeds the bytes it supplies. Clear the pointer after freeing so the readdir-side vfree() becomes a no-op.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks orangefs_prepare_cdm_array() sizes each client debug keyword buffer with strcspn(cds_head, " "), but then parses the keyword with %s. The %s conversion skips leading whitespace, while strcspn() does not. If a client debug entry starts with a space, the allocation can be sized for an empty keyword while sscanf() copies the following non-empty token. This can write past the end of the allocated keyword buffer. Skip leading spaces before computing the keyword length so the allocation matches the string parsed by sscanf().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: always run deallocs on copy-on-write completion Local fuzzing of 6.12.94 has found the following memory leak caused by doing 'copy_file_range()' within the same filesystem: unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c980 (size 32): comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ c0 c5 92 21 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 ...!............ backtrace (crc 7068d63f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline] ocfs2_find_per_slot_free_list fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6618 [inline] ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x155/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6786 ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline] ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613 ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline] __ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985 ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237 ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825 ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138 ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098 ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline] ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline] ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349 ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline] ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470 ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline] ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451 iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:944 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x232/0x480 fs/splice.c:1167 splice_direct_to_actor+0x4b4/0xb60 fs/splice.c:1111 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1210 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x10f/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1236 do_sendfile+0x430/0xbf0 fs/read_write.c:1388 unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c5c0 (size 32): comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 29 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 )p.............. backtrace (crc afec850f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline] ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x25c/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6793 ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline] ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613 ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline] __ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985 ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237 ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825 ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138 ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098 ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline] ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline] ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349 ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline] ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470 ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline] ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451 iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:9 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm". The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any other node with a malformed message. Three defects: - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215 attacker-controlled bytes. - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes. - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the message is large enough to hold that many entries, so dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len) copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic). The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is unaffected. o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a member of the cluster. Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request. I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement. This patch (of 2): A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[] array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain. Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate lengths in dlm_mig_lockres_handler A node receiving a DLM_MIG_LOCKRES message trusts several fields of the peer-supplied dlm_migratable_lockres without validation. num_locks and lockname_len are bounded only on the sending side, and the message is never checked to actually carry num_locks migratable_lock entries. As a result dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[0..num_locks) past the kmalloc(data_len) copy of the message (an out-of-bounds read that ends in a BUG_ON panic), and dlm_init_lockres() copies lockname_len bytes into the fixed 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object (a heap out-of-bounds write). Both are reachable by any node in the domain. Validate these fields right after dlm_grab(), before anything uses them -- including the not-joined error path, which already prints mres->lockname with the unbounded lockname_len as a %.*s precision. Reject the message unless lockname_len <= DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX, num_locks <= DLM_MAX_MIGRATABLE_LOCKS (the bound the sender already asserts), and the payload is large enough to hold the claimed locks. Conforming recovery and migration messages are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array with: for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) { rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i]; ... rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the 16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW operation walks the array. A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does: if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used)) memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1], &rf_list->rl_recs[index], (le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) * sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec)); i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink (FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem. ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC, signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]: if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block(): reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used > rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set, because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list (rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing "!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or rf_list is the live member of the union. With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove() in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(). Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build: replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in __ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch, and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the forged rl_used/rl_count.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate directory-index entry counts when reading metadata ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and signature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level callers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts against the capacity of the block that holds them. ocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(entry_list->de_num_used); i++) dx_entry = &entry_list->de_entries[i]; over de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either dx_leaf->dl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root, dx_root->dr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and de_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff and make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving a slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open() on an indexed directory once the image is mounted. Commit 775c17386a6f ("ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during block read") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left the inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the same read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the capacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and de_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry array. de_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or inline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid image. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: cluster: don't sleep while holding o2hb_live_lock in o2hb_region_pin() Patch series "ocfs2: cluster: o2hb_region_pin() fixes", v2. This series fixes three related issues in o2hb_region_pin(), all are from the original implementation in commit: 58a3158a5d17 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions"): 1) It is called with o2hb_live_lock (a spinlock) held, but the underlying configfs_depend_item() sleeps (takes inode rwsem and pins the filesystem). This triggers BUG under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP. 2) When called from the configfs drop_item callback, it creates a lock order inversion: parent inode_lock -> configfs root inode_lock, which can deadlock against subsystem unregistration paths taking root -> parent. 3) If pinning fails partway through o2hb_region_inc_user(), the o2hb_dependent_users counter is leaked and partially-pinned regions are never released, leaving heartbeat regions unprotected on subsequent mounts. Patch 1 reworks o2hb_region_pin() to drop o2hb_live_lock across each sleeping configfs_depend_item() call, using a config_item reference to keep the region alive while unlocked. Patch 2 adds a from_callback parameter to select configfs_depend_item_unlocked() when called from configfs context, avoiding the inode_lock nesting. Patch 3 fixes the error path in o2hb_region_inc_user() to unpin and decrement the counter on failure. This patch (of 3): o2hb_region_pin() is always called with the o2hb_live_lock spinlock held (from o2hb_region_inc_user() and o2hb_heartbeat_group_drop_item()), but it calls o2nm_depend_item() -> configfs_depend_item(), which sleeps: it pins the configfs filesystem and takes the configfs root inode rwsem. Under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP this triggers: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c in_atomic(): 1, ... name: mount.ocfs2 down_write configfs_depend_item o2hb_region_pin o2hb_region_inc_user o2hb_register_callback dlm_register_domain_handlers ... ocfs2_dlm_init ocfs2_mount_volume ocfs2_fill_super Rework o2hb_region_pin() to pin one region at a time with the lock dropped across the sleeping call: under o2hb_live_lock find the next eligible region and take a config_item reference to keep it alive, drop the lock, call o2nm_depend_item(), then retake the lock and record the pin. The config_item_put() is done with the lock released as well, since o2hb_region_release() also acquires o2hb_live_lock and can sleep. The region list may change while unlocked, so the scan restarts from the top after each pin. Local heartbeat still pins only the matching region; global heartbeat pins all eligible regions. The unpin path is unaffected: configfs_undepend_item() only takes a spinlock and does not sleep.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix readdir position truncation on 32-bit kernels In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is rebuilt with ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset; `ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1) is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of `ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is allowed to exceed 4 GiB. When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely. This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross 4 GiB reaches it. This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND: ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset; 64-bit kernels are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscall sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to dereference the freed state. An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the netns is torn down. Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET traverses the RCU-protected limit lists. Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet .pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex. The pernet core guarantees an RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization. The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket's namespace.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: only skb_tx_error() a packet we are about to drop queue_userspace_packet() borrows the packet skb -- it only copies it into a private netlink message (user_skb) and does not own it; on return do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding it through the flow's remaining actions. Its error path nevertheless calls skb_tx_error(skb), which via skb_zcopy_clear() does skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, stripping SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG from that live skb (skb_tx_error()'s kerneldoc says "skb must be freed afterwards"). For a MSG_ZEROCOPY skb carrying page-cache frags, SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is what makes esp_input() skb_cow_data() before in-place AEAD; once it is stripped a later local ESP-in-UDP delivery decrypts in place over pages the sender does not own -- an unprivileged page-cache write (the "Fragnesia" primitive). do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return value, so any action after a failed USERSPACE upcall inherits the stripped skb. Move the skb_tx_error() to the flow-miss drop path - the "default" branch of ovs_dp_process_packet()'s switch(error), before kfree_skb(). The call has been here since commit 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") but was harmless until esp_input() began relying on SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to gate in-place decrypt; only then did stripping it on a still-forwarded skb become a page-cache write primitive.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Fix use-after-free of cmd_rcvr in _ipmi_destroy_user() Commit 9e91f8a6c868 ("ipmi:msghandler: Remove srcu for the ipmi_interfaces list") dropped the synchronize_rcu() between unlinking the command receivers from intf->cmd_rcvrs and freeing them, updating only the comment that explains why the barrier is needed. The cmd_rcvrs list is still traversed under plain RCU: find_cmd_rcvr() walks it inside rcu_read_lock(), and handle_ipmb_get_msg_cmd() borrows rcvr->user from that lookup within the same read-side section. Without the grace period, _ipmi_destroy_user() can kfree() a cmd_rcvr while a reader still holds a pointer to it, causing a use-after-free. The rework only made srcu unnecessary for the interfaces list; the cmd_rcvrs list still relies on plain RCU. Restore the synchronize_rcu() before freeing the receivers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lockd: pin next file across nlm_inspect_file lock-drop nlm_traverse_files() pins the current file with f_count++ across a mutex_unlock for nlm_inspect_file(), but nothing pins the saved next pointer. A concurrent nlm_release_file() can kfree the next file during the unlock window, and the iterator dereferences freed memory on the next loop step. Pin both current and next before the lock-drop. Advance by swapping the pinned cursors at the end of each iteration so next is always held alive across the unlock. Always call nlm_file_release() after dropping the iteration pin, regardless of whether the file matched the predicate. Use nlm_file_inuse(), which does a live walk of the inode lock list, rather than the cached f_locks field, so skipped files that never ran nlm_inspect_file() are evaluated correctly. Because every file in a hash bucket is now pinned and released, files skipped by the is_failover_file predicate that have no locks, blocks, shares, or external references are deleted during traversal. The old code never evaluated skipped files for cleanup. The new behavior is intentional: such files are stale and should not persist in the table.