CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability in the Linux kernel affects the intel-thc-hid driver, specifically in the write_cmd_to_txdma() function, which fails to validate the size of incoming reports before copying them into a heap buffer. This oversight can lead to a heap buffer overflow, allowing an attacker to exploit this flaw by sending oversized reports, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or system crashes. Organizations using affected versions of the Linux kernel, particularly those deploying touch controllers, should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate risks associated with unauthorized access and system instability.
Original NVD Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer: memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len); The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with attacker-controlled length and content. Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix. write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well. That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report.