CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe vulnerability affects the Linux kernel's signed loader, specifically in its handling of non-exclusive metadata maps within the libbpf component. If exploited, this could allow malicious BPF programs to manipulate the contents of a frozen map, leading to potential data integrity issues. Organizations utilizing Linux systems with BPF functionality should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to ensure the security and reliability of their applications.
Original NVD Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is called on the frozen map. While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data. With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.