CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedAuthenticated S3 principals in SeaweedFS versions prior to 4.40 can exploit a flaw that allows them to overwrite objects outside their permitted scope by misusing the PutObjectAcl function. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data loss or corruption, as ACL changes intended for a specific object can inadvertently affect other objects at the bucket root. Organizations using SeaweedFS should prioritize upgrading to version 4.40 to mitigate this risk.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.