CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedRAGFlow versions prior to 0.26.3 are vulnerable to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the agent workflow "Invoke" component, allowing attackers to craft outbound requests to internal network resources, including sensitive cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability can be exploited by any user capable of triggering an agent, potentially leading to unauthorized access to internal services and data leakage. Organizations using RAGFlow should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate risks associated with SSRF attacks.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
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Original NVD Description
RAGFlow before 0.26.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the agent workflow "Invoke" component (agent/component/invoke.py). The component builds an outbound request URL from canvas configuration and runtime template variables and passes it to requests.get, requests.post, or requests.put without calling the shared assert_url_is_safe validator or pinning the resolved address, unlike the crawler, SearXNG, file-upload, and RSS fetch paths. A user who can create or trigger an agent can direct the server to fetch loopback, link-local, and RFC 1918 destinations, including cloud instance metadata endpoints and services co-located on the deployment network, and the response body is returned as the component output. Where an agent is configured to interpolate the chat query into the Invoke URL, the destination is chosen by whoever can send that query.