SEPTEMBER 18, 2026
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Case File

CVE-2026-75759

HIGH · CVSS 7.6 EPSS 0.14% Public Exploit

Source: NVD + CISA KEV + EPSS · Published 2026-08-30 · Last synced 2026-09-18

CyberRota Analysis

AI-Generated

The vulnerability in the erlef oidcc library allows unauthenticated attackers to impersonate any user by exploiting improper verification of cryptographic signatures in encrypted ID tokens or JARM responses. This flaw enables attackers to create valid tokens with arbitrary claims if they possess the relying party's public encryption key, potentially leading to unauthorized access and identity spoofing. Organizations using oidcc versions from 3.2.0-beta.1 to 3.9.0 should prioritize patching this vulnerability to mitigate the risk of user impersonation and ensure secure authentication practices.

Public Exploit Signal

A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.

Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.

CVE
CVE-2026-75759
Severity
HIGH
CVSS
7.6
EPSS
0.14%

Original NVD Description

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in erlef oidcc allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate an arbitrary user via an encrypted ID token or JARM response carrying no nested signature. OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 2 requires that an encrypted ID token be signed then encrypted, with the result being a Nested JWT, and JARM processing rule 5 requires the client to check the signature unconditionally. oidcc instead accepted a JWE wrapping unsigned claims as fully validated, so anyone holding the relying party's public encryption key could mint a token with an arbitrary sub, iss, and aud without possessing the provider's signing key. In oidcc_jwt_util:verify_decrypted_token/4, a decrypted payload that is not a signed JWS fell back to parsing the plaintext claims and returning them with no verifying key. oidcc_token:int_validate_jwt/4 then matched on the JOSE structure type rather than on whether a signature had been verified, and returned success. The JARM path in oidcc_token:validate_jarm/3 is reachable through the browser front channel. UserInfo responses are not affected, because OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3.2 permits them to be encrypted without also being signed. This issue affects oidcc: from 3.2.0-beta.1 before 3.9.0.