CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedThe Support Genix plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to an authentication bypass that allows authenticated attackers with subscriber-level access or higher to take over administrator accounts. This vulnerability arises from weak key derivation methods and lack of proper security measures, enabling attackers to recover the site-wide encryption key and forge valid tokens to gain full administrative privileges. WordPress site administrators using this plugin should prioritize immediate patching or mitigation efforts to prevent potential account takeovers.
Original NVD Description
The Support Genix – Helpdesk, AI Chatbot, Knowledge Base & Customer Support Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.52 via the `guest_ticket_login()` function and its `p` parameter. This is due to the site-wide AES-256-CBC encryption key being derived from only three two-digit `wp_rand(10, 99)` values and a Unix timestamp via `md5()` — yielding approximately 19.5 bits of entropy — combined with a deterministic IV derived from the password, no authentication tag on the ciphertext, and no capability check, nonce, or session validation on the publicly reachable `/sgnix/?p=<token>` endpoint. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, who can obtain a single legitimate guest ticket token as a known-plaintext oracle and bound the plugin activation timestamp, to exhaust the ~729,000-candidate keyspace entirely offline, recover the site-wide encryption key, and forge a self-consistent `{ticket_id, ticket_user}` token targeting any administrator-owned ticket. Submitting the forged token to the unprotected endpoint causes `wp_set_auth_cookie()` to be called for that administrator, granting the attacker full administrative access to the WordPress site.