CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedNet::SAML2 versions prior to 0.86 for Perl are vulnerable to SAML authentication bypass due to improper handling of certificate validation when no trust anchor is configured. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a response signed with a self-generated key, leading to the potential authentication of arbitrary assertions. Organizations utilizing this library for SAML authentication should prioritize patching to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access.
Original NVD Description
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.
Related CVEs
Other vulnerabilities affecting the same vendor(s)