CyberRota Analysis
AI-GeneratedOpenPLC Runtime v3 is vulnerable due to an authenticated arbitrary file write flaw in its legacy web UI program-upload workflow, allowing attackers to upload files to any writable location on the server. This can lead to severe consequences, including arbitrary code execution, if an attacker writes a malicious C++ source file into the runtime core directory. Organizations using OpenPLC should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to prevent potential exploitation by authenticated users.
Public Exploit Signal
A public exploit, PoC, GitHub repository or Metasploit reference was detected for this CVE.
Note: these links are listed for security research and verification purposes only.
Original NVD Description
OpenPLC Runtime v3 contains an authenticated arbitrary file write vulnerability in the legacy web UI program‑upload workflow. The application stores an attacker‑supplied filename (prog_file) directly into the Programs.File database field and later uses this value as the destination path for an uploaded file without validating or restricting the path. Because Python os.path.join() honors attacker‑controlled absolute paths, an authenticated user can write arbitrary files anywhere writable by the OpenPLC webserver process. In the default build pipeline, all C++ source files within the OpenPLC runtime core directory are automatically compiled into the executable runtime binary. By writing a malicious .cpp file into this directory, an authenticated attacker can escalate the arbitrary file write into arbitrary native code execution when the operator triggers a normal program compilation and runtime start.