CVE Database

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: i2c: fix skb memory leak in receive path When 'midev->allow_rx' is false, the newly allocated skb isn't consumed by netif_rx(), it needs to free the skb directly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mctp: route: hold key->lock in mctp_flow_prepare_output() mctp_flow_prepare_output() checks key->dev and may call mctp_dev_set_key(), but it does not hold key->lock while doing so. mctp_dev_set_key() and mctp_dev_release_key() are annotated with __must_hold(&key->lock), so key->dev access is intended to be serialized by key->lock. The mctp_sendmsg() transmit path reaches mctp_flow_prepare_output() via mctp_local_output() -> mctp_dst_output() without holding key->lock, so the check-and-set sequence is racy. Example interleaving: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- mctp_flow_prepare_output(key, devA) if (!key->dev) // sees NULL mctp_flow_prepare_output( key, devB) if (!key->dev) // still NULL mctp_dev_set_key(devB, key) mctp_dev_hold(devB) key->dev = devB mctp_dev_set_key(devA, key) mctp_dev_hold(devA) key->dev = devA // overwrites devB Now both devA and devB references were acquired, but only the final key->dev value is tracked for release. One reference can be lost, causing a resource leak as mctp_dev_release_key() would only decrease the reference on one dev. Fix by taking key->lock around the key->dev check and mctp_dev_set_key() call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: fix entry leak in bridge verdict error path nfqnl_recv_verdict() calls find_dequeue_entry() to remove the queue entry from the queue data structures, taking ownership of the entry. For PF_BRIDGE packets, it then calls nfqa_parse_bridge() to parse VLAN attributes. If nfqa_parse_bridge() returns an error (e.g. NFQA_VLAN present but NFQA_VLAN_TCI missing), the function returns immediately without freeing the dequeued entry or its sk_buff. This leaks the nf_queue_entry, its associated sk_buff, and all held references (net_device refcounts, struct net refcount). Repeated triggering exhausts kernel memory. Fix this by dropping the entry via nfqnl_reinject() with NF_DROP verdict on the error path, consistent with other error handling in this file.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-pci: Fix race bug in nvme_poll_irqdisable() In the following scenario, pdev can be disabled between (1) and (3) by (2). This sets pdev->msix_enabled = 0. Then, pci_irq_vector() will return MSI-X IRQ(>15) for (1) whereas return INTx IRQ(<=15) for (2). This causes IRQ warning because it tries to enable INTx IRQ that has never been disabled before. To fix this, save IRQ number into a local variable and ensure disable_irq() and enable_irq() operate on the same IRQ number. Even if pci_free_irq_vectors() frees the IRQ concurrently, disable_irq() and enable_irq() on a stale IRQ number is still valid and safe, and the depth accounting reamins balanced. task 1: nvme_poll_irqdisable() disable_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)) ...(1) enable_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)) ...(3) task 2: nvme_reset_work() nvme_dev_disable() pdev->msix_enable = 0; ...(2) crash log: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Unbalanced enable for IRQ 10 WARNING: kernel/irq/manage.c:753 at __enable_irq+0x102/0x190 kernel/irq/manage.c:753, CPU#1: kworker/1:0H/26 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 26 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #9 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work RIP: 0010:__enable_irq+0x107/0x190 kernel/irq/manage.c:753 Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 79 48 8d 3d 2e 7a 3f 05 41 8b 74 24 2c <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 ef b9 21 00 5b 41 5c 5d e9 46 54 66 03 e8 e1 b9 RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bf550 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb20c0e90 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffffffb74b88f0 RBP: ffffc900001bf560 R08: ffff88800197cf00 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880012a6000 R13: 1ffff92000037eae R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000000000000293 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b49f7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000555da4a25fa8 CR3: 00000000208e8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> enable_irq+0x121/0x1e0 kernel/irq/manage.c:797 nvme_poll_irqdisable+0x162/0x1c0 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:1494 nvme_timeout+0x965/0x14b0 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:1744 blk_mq_rq_timed_out block/blk-mq.c:1653 [inline] blk_mq_handle_expired+0x227/0x2d0 block/blk-mq.c:1721 bt_iter+0x2fc/0x3a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:292 __sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:269 [inline] sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:290 [inline] bt_for_each block/blk-mq-tag.c:324 [inline] blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x969/0x1e80 block/blk-mq-tag.c:536 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x627/0x870 block/blk-mq.c:1763 process_one_work+0x956/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x65c/0xe60 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x41a/0x930 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x6f8/0x8c0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> irq event stamp: 74478 hardirqs last enabled at (74477): [<ffffffffb5720a9c>] __raw_spin_unlock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:159 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (74477): [<ffffffffb5720a9c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:202 hardirqs last disabled at (74478): [<ffffffffb57207b5>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (74478): [<ffffffffb57207b5>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xdc/0x120 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Fix runtime suspend deadlock when there is pending job The runtime suspend callback drains the running job workqueue before suspending the device. If a job is still executing and calls pm_runtime_resume_and_get(), it can deadlock with the runtime suspend path. Fix this by moving pm_runtime_resume_and_get() from the job execution routine to the job submission routine, ensuring the device is resumed before the job is queued and avoiding the deadlock during runtime suspend.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: e1000/e1000e: Fix leak in DMA error cleanup If an error is encountered while mapping TX buffers, the driver should unmap any buffers already mapped for that skb. Because count is incremented after a successful mapping, it will always match the correct number of unmappings needed when dma_error is reached. Decrementing count before the while loop in dma_error causes an off-by-one error. If any mapping was successful before an unsuccessful mapping, exactly one DMA mapping would leak. In these commits, a faulty while condition caused an infinite loop in dma_error: Commit 03b1320dfcee ("e1000e: remove use of skb_dma_map from e1000e driver") Commit 602c0554d7b0 ("e1000: remove use of skb_dma_map from e1000 driver") Commit c1fa347f20f1 ("e1000/e1000e/igb/igbvf/ixgb/ixgbe: Fix tests of unsigned in *_tx_map()") fixed the infinite loop, but introduced the off-by-one error. This issue may still exist in the igbvf driver, but I did not address it in this patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Unreserve bo if queue update failed Error handling path should unreserve bo then return failed. (cherry picked from commit c24afed7de9ecce341825d8ab55a43a254348b33)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: acp-mach-common: Add missing error check for clock acquisition The acp_card_rt5682_init() and acp_card_rt5682s_init() functions did not check the return values of clk_get(). This could lead to a kernel crash when the invalid pointers are later dereferenced by clock core functions. Fix this by: 1. Changing clk_get() to the device-managed devm_clk_get(). 2. Adding IS_ERR() checks immediately after each clock acquisition.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: fix race between task migration and iteration When a task is migrated out of a css_set, cgroup_migrate_add_task() first moves it from cset->tasks to cset->mg_tasks via: list_move_tail(&task->cg_list, &cset->mg_tasks); If a css_task_iter currently has it->task_pos pointing to this task, css_set_move_task() calls css_task_iter_skip() to keep the iterator valid. However, since the task has already been moved to ->mg_tasks, the iterator is advanced relative to the mg_tasks list instead of the original tasks list. As a result, remaining tasks on cset->tasks, as well as tasks queued on cset->mg_tasks, can be skipped by iteration. Fix this by calling css_set_skip_task_iters() before unlinking task->cg_list from cset->tasks. This advances all active iterators to the next task on cset->tasks, so iteration continues correctly even when a task is concurrently being migrated. This race is hard to hit in practice without instrumentation, but it can be reproduced by artificially slowing down cgroup_procs_show(). For example, on an Android device a temporary /sys/kernel/cgroup/cgroup_test knob can be added to inject a delay into cgroup_procs_show(), and then: 1) Spawn three long-running tasks (PIDs 101, 102, 103). 2) Create a test cgroup and move the tasks into it. 3) Enable a large delay via /sys/kernel/cgroup/cgroup_test. 4) In one shell, read cgroup.procs from the test cgroup. 5) Within the delay window, in another shell migrate PID 102 by writing it to a different cgroup.procs file. Under this setup, cgroup.procs can intermittently show only PID 101 while skipping PID 103. Once the migration completes, reading the file again shows all tasks as expected. Note that this change does not allow removing the existing css_set_skip_task_iters() call in css_set_move_task(). The new call in cgroup_migrate_add_task() only handles iterators that are racing with migration while the task is still on cset->tasks. Iterators may also start after the task has been moved to cset->mg_tasks. If we dropped css_set_skip_task_iters() from css_set_move_task(), such iterators could keep task_pos pointing to a migrating task, causing css_task_iter_advance() to malfunction on the destination css_set, up to and including crashes or infinite loops. The race window between migration and iteration is very small, and css_task_iter is not on a hot path. In the worst case, when an iterator is positioned on the first thread of the migrating process, cgroup_migrate_add_task() may have to skip multiple tasks via css_set_skip_task_iters(). However, this only happens when migration and iteration actually race, so the performance impact is negligible compared to the correctness fix provided here.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Check endpoint numbers at parsing Scarlett2 mixer interfaces The Scarlett2 mixer quirk in USB-audio driver may hit a NULL dereference when a malformed USB descriptor is passed, since it assumes the presence of an endpoint in the parsed interface in scarlett2_find_fc_interface(), as reported by fuzzer. For avoiding the NULL dereference, just add the sanity check of bNumEndpoints and skip the invalid interface.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: fix oneway spam detection The spam detection logic in TreeRange was executed before the current request was inserted into the tree. So the new request was not being factored in the spam calculation. Fix this by moving the logic after the new range has been inserted. Also, the detection logic for ArrayRange was missing altogether which meant large spamming transactions could get away without being detected. Fix this by implementing an equivalent low_oneway_space() in ArrayRange. Note that I looked into centralizing this logic in RangeAllocator but iterating through 'state' and 'size' got a bit too complicated (for me) and I abandoned this effort.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Fix memory leak in xhci_disable_slot() xhci_alloc_command() allocates a command structure and, when the second argument is true, also allocates a completion structure. Currently, the error handling path in xhci_disable_slot() only frees the command structure using kfree(), causing the completion structure to leak. Use xhci_free_command() instead of kfree(). xhci_free_command() correctly frees both the command structure and the associated completion structure. Since the command structure is allocated with zero-initialization, command->in_ctx is NULL and will not be erroneously freed by xhci_free_command(). This bug was found using an experimental static analysis tool we are developing. The tool is based on the LLVM framework and is specifically designed to detect memory management issues. It is currently under active development and not yet publicly available, but we plan to open-source it after our research is published. The bug was originally detected on v6.13-rc1 using our static analysis tool, and we have verified that the issue persists in the latest mainline kernel. We performed build testing on x86_64 with allyesconfig using GCC=11.4.0. Since triggering these error paths in xhci_disable_slot() requires specific hardware conditions or abnormal state, we were unable to construct a test case to reliably trigger these specific error paths at runtime.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Fix NULL pointer dereference when reading portli debugfs files Michal reported and debgged a NULL pointer dereference bug in the recently added portli debugfs files Oops is caused when there are more port registers counted in xhci->max_ports than ports reported by Supported Protocol capabilities. This is possible if max_ports is more than maximum port number, or if there are gaps between ports of different speeds the 'Supported Protocol' capabilities. In such cases port->rhub will be NULL so we can't reach xhci behind it. Add an explicit NULL check for this case, and print portli in hex without dereferencing port->rhub.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: yurex: fix race in probe The bbu member of the descriptor must be set to the value standing for uninitialized values before the URB whose completion handler sets bbu is submitted. Otherwise there is a window during which probing can overwrite already retrieved data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: usbtmc: Use usb_bulk_msg_killable() with user-specified timeouts The usbtmc driver accepts timeout values specified by the user in an ioctl command, and uses these timeouts for some usb_bulk_msg() calls. Since the user can specify arbitrarily long timeouts and usb_bulk_msg() uses unkillable waits, call usb_bulk_msg_killable() instead to avoid the possibility of the user hanging a kernel thread indefinitely.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: core: Limit the length of unkillable synchronous timeouts The usb_control_msg(), usb_bulk_msg(), and usb_interrupt_msg() APIs in usbcore allow unlimited timeout durations. And since they use uninterruptible waits, this leaves open the possibility of hanging a task for an indefinitely long time, with no way to kill it short of unplugging the target device. To prevent this sort of problem, enforce a maximum limit on the length of these unkillable timeouts. The limit chosen here, somewhat arbitrarily, is 60 seconds. On many systems (although not all) this is short enough to avoid triggering the kernel's hung-task detector. In addition, clear up the ambiguity of negative timeout values by treating them the same as 0, i.e., using the maximum allowed timeout.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: image: mdc800: kill download URB on timeout mdc800_device_read() submits download_urb and waits for completion. If the timeout fires and the device has not responded, the function returns without killing the URB, leaving it active. A subsequent read() resubmits the same URB while it is still in-flight, triggering the WARN in usb_submit_urb(): "URB submitted while active" Check the return value of wait_event_timeout() and kill the URB if it indicates timeout, ensuring the URB is complete before its status is inspected or the URB is resubmitted. Similar to - commit 372c93131998 ("USB: yurex: fix control-URB timeout handling") - commit b98d5000c505 ("media: rc: iguanair: handle timeouts")

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: Fix NULL pointer dereferences in nexus handling The `tpg->tpg_nexus` pointer in the USB Target driver is dynamically managed and tied to userspace configuration via ConfigFS. It can be NULL if the USB host sends requests before the nexus is fully established or immediately after it is dropped. Currently, functions like `bot_submit_command()` and the data transfer paths retrieve `tv_nexus = tpg->tpg_nexus` and immediately dereference `tv_nexus->tvn_se_sess` without any validation. If a malicious or misconfigured USB host sends a BOT (Bulk-Only Transport) command during this race window, it triggers a NULL pointer dereference, leading to a kernel panic (local DoS). This exposes an inconsistent API usage within the module, as peer functions like `usbg_submit_command()` and `bot_send_bad_response()` correctly implement a NULL check for `tv_nexus` before proceeding. Fix this by bringing consistency to the nexus handling. Add the missing `if (!tv_nexus)` checks to the vulnerable BOT command and request processing paths, aborting the command gracefully with an error instead of crashing the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move The network device outlived its parent gadget device during disconnection, resulting in dangling sysfs links and null pointer dereference problems. A prior attempt to solve this by removing SET_NETDEV_DEV entirely [1] was reverted due to power management ordering concerns and a NO-CARRIER regression. A subsequent attempt to defer net_device allocation to bind [2] broke 1:1 mapping between function instance and network device, making it impossible for configfs to report the resolved interface name. This results in a regression where the DHCP server fails on pmOS. Use device_move to reparent the net_device between the gadget device and /sys/devices/virtual/ across bind/unbind cycles. This preserves the network interface across USB reconnection, allowing the DHCP server to retain their binding. Introduce gether_attach_gadget()/gether_detach_gadget() helpers and use __free(detach_gadget) macro to undo attachment on bind failure. The bind_count ensures device_move executes only on the first bind. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f2a4f9847617a0929d62025748384092e5f35cce.camel@crapouillou.net/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/795ea759-7eaf-4f78-81f4-01ffbf2d7961@ixit.cz/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink During async unlink, we drop the `i_nlink` counter before we receive the completion (that will eventually update the `i_nlink`) because "we assume that the unlink will succeed". That is not a bad idea, but it races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like this one: WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 Modules linked in: CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655 Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720 sp : ffff80012173bc90 x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680 x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203 x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365 x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74 x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94 x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P) vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8 do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion. Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own completion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the `i_nlink` counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new `i_nlink` value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it further. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then. The WARNING can be reproduced this way: 1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed. (Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel, without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.) 2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is called. This guarantees that the `i_nlink` is already zero before drop_nlink() runs. The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero, but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the `ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock` spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this seems like the proper lock to protect the `i_nlink` updates. I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using `inode.i_lock`) and AFS (using `afs_vnode.cb_lock`). All three have the zero check as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path() Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path" pointer obtained by __getname(). If ownership of this pointer is not passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it before returning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Prevent CID stalls due to concurrent forks A newly forked task is accounted as MMCID user before the task is visible in the process' thread list and the global task list. This creates the following problem: CPU1 CPU2 fork() sched_mm_cid_fork(tnew1) tnew1->mm.mm_cid_users++; tnew1->mm_cid.cid = getcid() -> preemption fork() sched_mm_cid_fork(tnew2) tnew2->mm.mm_cid_users++; // Reaches the per CPU threshold mm_cid_fixup_tasks_to_cpus() for_each_other(current, p) .... As tnew1 is not visible yet, this fails to fix up the already allocated CID of tnew1. As a consequence a subsequent schedule in might fail to acquire a (transitional) CID and the machine stalls. Move the invocation of sched_mm_cid_fork() after the new task becomes visible in the thread and the task list to prevent this. This also makes it symmetrical vs. exit() where the task is removed as CID user before the task is removed from the thread and task lists.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/mmcid: Handle vfork()/CLONE_VM correctly Matthieu and Jiri reported stalls where a task endlessly loops in mm_get_cid() when scheduling in. It turned out that the logic which handles vfork()'ed tasks is broken. It is invoked when the number of tasks associated to a process is smaller than the number of MMCID users. It then walks the task list to find the vfork()'ed task, but accounts all the already processed tasks as well. If that double processing brings the number of to be handled tasks to 0, the walk stops and the vfork()'ed task's CID is not fixed up. As a consequence a subsequent schedule in fails to acquire a (transitional) CID and the machine stalls. Cure this by removing the accounting condition and make the fixup always walk the full task list if it could not find the exact number of users in the process' thread list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain It may happen that mm is already released, which leads to kernel panic. This adds the NULL check for current->mm, similarly to commit 20afc60f892d ("x86, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain"). I was getting this panic when running a profiling BPF program (profile.py from bcc-tools): [26215.051935] Kernel attempted to read user page (588) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) [26215.051950] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000588 [26215.051952] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000020fac0 [26215.051957] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [...] [26215.052049] Call Trace: [26215.052050] [c000000061da6d30] [c00000000020fc10] perf_callchain_user_64+0x2d0/0x490 (unreliable) [26215.052054] [c000000061da6dc0] [c00000000020f92c] perf_callchain_user+0x1c/0x30 [26215.052057] [c000000061da6de0] [c0000000005ab2a0] get_perf_callchain+0x100/0x360 [26215.052063] [c000000061da6e70] [c000000000573bc8] bpf_get_stackid+0x88/0xf0 [26215.052067] [c000000061da6ea0] [c008000000042258] bpf_prog_16d4ab9ab662f669_do_perf_event+0xf8/0x274 [...] In addition, move storing the top-level stack entry to generic perf_callchain_user to make sure the top-evel entry is always captured, even if current->mm is NULL. [Maddy: fixed message to avoid checkpatch format style error]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Fix SError in ufshcd_rtc_work() during UFS suspend In __ufshcd_wl_suspend(), cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called to cancel the UFS RTC work, but it is placed after ufshcd_vops_suspend(hba, pm_op, POST_CHANGE). This creates a race condition where ufshcd_rtc_work() can still be running while ufshcd_vops_suspend() is executing. When UFSHCD_CAP_CLK_GATING is not supported, the condition !hba->clk_gating.active_reqs is always true, causing ufshcd_update_rtc() to be executed. Since ufshcd_vops_suspend() typically performs clock gating operations, executing ufshcd_update_rtc() at that moment triggers an SError. The kernel panic trace is as follows: Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xec/0x128 show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 panic+0x148/0x374 nmi_panic+0x3c/0x8c arm64_serror_panic+0x64/0x8c do_serror+0xc4/0xc8 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c el1h_64_error+0x68/0x6c el1_interrupt+0x20/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c ktime_get+0xc4/0x12c ufshcd_mcq_sq_stop+0x4c/0xec ufshcd_mcq_sq_cleanup+0x64/0x1dc ufshcd_clear_cmd+0x38/0x134 ufshcd_issue_dev_cmd+0x298/0x4d0 ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd+0x1a4/0x1c4 ufshcd_query_attr+0xbc/0x19c ufshcd_rtc_work+0x10c/0x1c8 process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8 kthread+0x120/0x1d8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fix this by moving cancel_delayed_work_sync() before the call to ufshcd_vops_suspend(hba, pm_op, PRE_CHANGE), ensuring the UFS RTC work is fully completed or cancelled at that point.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: hisi_sas: Fix NULL pointer exception during user_scan() user_scan() invokes updated sas_user_scan() for channel 0, and if successful, iteratively scans remaining channels (1 to shost->max_channel) via scsi_scan_host_selected() in commit 37c4e72b0651 ("scsi: Fix sas_user_scan() to handle wildcard and multi-channel scans"). However, hisi_sas supports only one channel, and the current value of max_channel is 1. sas_user_scan() for channel 1 will trigger the following NULL pointer exception: [ 441.554662] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000008b0 [ 441.554699] Mem abort info: [ 441.554710] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 441.554718] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 441.554723] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 441.554726] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 441.554730] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 441.554735] Data abort info: [ 441.554737] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 441.554742] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 441.554747] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 441.554752] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000828377a6000 [ 441.554757] [00000000000008b0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 441.554769] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 441.629589] Modules linked in: arm_spe_pmu arm_smmuv3_pmu tpm_tis_spi hisi_uncore_sllc_pmu hisi_uncore_pa_pmu hisi_uncore_l3c_pmu hisi_uncore_hha_pmu hisi_uncore_ddrc_pmu hisi_uncore_cpa_pmu hns3_pmu hisi_ptt hisi_pcie_pmu tpm_tis_core spidev spi_hisi_sfc_v3xx hisi_uncore_pmu spi_dw_mmio fuse hclge hclge_common hisi_sec2 hisi_hpre hisi_zip hisi_qm hns3 hisi_sas_v3_hw sm3_ce sbsa_gwdt hnae3 hisi_sas_main uacce hisi_dma i2c_hisi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 441.670819] CPU: 46 UID: 0 PID: 6994 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #84 PREEMPT [ 441.691327] pstate: 81400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 441.698277] pc : sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x44/0x118 [ 441.702896] lr : sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x3c/0x118 [ 441.707502] sp : ffff80009abbba40 [ 441.710805] x29: ffff80009abbba40 x28: ffff082819a40008 x27: ffff082810c37c08 [ 441.717930] x26: ffff082810c37c28 x25: ffff082819a40290 x24: ffff082810c37c00 [ 441.725054] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff082819a40000 [ 441.732179] x20: ffff082819a40290 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 441.739304] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffb5dad6bda690 x15: 00000000ffffffff [ 441.746428] x14: ffff082814c3b26c x13: 00000000ffffffff x12: ffff082814c3b26a [ 441.753553] x11: 00000000000000c0 x10: 000000000000003a x9 : ffffb5dad5ea94f4 [ 441.760678] x8 : 000000000000003a x7 : ffff80009abbbab0 x6 : 0000000000000030 [ 441.767802] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 441.774926] x2 : ffff08280f35a300 x1 : ffffb5dad7127180 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 441.782053] Call trace: [ 441.784488] sas_find_dev_by_rphy+0x44/0x118 (P) [ 441.789095] sas_target_alloc+0x24/0xb0 [ 441.792920] scsi_alloc_target+0x290/0x330 [ 441.797010] __scsi_scan_target+0x88/0x258 [ 441.801096] scsi_scan_channel+0x74/0xb8 [ 441.805008] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x170/0x188 [ 441.809615] sas_user_scan+0xfc/0x148 [ 441.813267] store_scan+0x10c/0x180 [ 441.816743] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 [ 441.820398] sysfs_kf_write+0x84/0xa8 [ 441.824054] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1c8 [ 441.828487] vfs_write+0x2c0/0x370 [ 441.831880] ksys_write+0x74/0x118 [ 441.835271] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 [ 441.839182] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 [ 441.842919] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 [ 441.847611] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 [ 441.850913] el0_svc+0x38/0x158 [ 441.854043] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 [ 441.858214] el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 [ 441.861865] Code: aa1303e0 97ff70a8 34ffff80 d10a4273 (f9445a75) [ 441.867946] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Therefore ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: qcom: qdsp6: Fix q6apm remove ordering during ADSP stop and start During ADSP stop and start, the kernel crashes due to the order in which ASoC components are removed. On ADSP stop, the q6apm-audio .remove callback unloads topology and removes PCM runtimes during ASoC teardown. This deletes the RTDs that contain the q6apm DAI components before their removal pass runs, leaving those components still linked to the card and causing crashes on the next rebind. Fix this by ensuring that all dependent (child) components are removed first, and the q6apm component is removed last. [ 48.105720] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000d0 [ 48.114763] Mem abort info: [ 48.117650] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 48.121526] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 48.127010] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 48.130172] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 48.133415] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 48.138446] Data abort info: [ 48.141422] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 48.147079] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 48.152354] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 48.157859] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001173cf000 [ 48.164517] [00000000000000d0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 48.171530] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 48.177348] Modules linked in: q6prm_clocks q6apm_lpass_dais q6apm_dai snd_q6dsp_common q6prm snd_q6apm 8021q garp mrp stp llc snd_soc_hdmi_codec apr pdr_interface phy_qcom_edp fastrpc qcom_pd_mapper rpmsg_ctrl qrtr_smd rpmsg_char qcom_pdr_msg qcom_iris v4l2_mem2mem videobuf2_dma_contig ath11k_pci msm ubwc_config at24 ath11k videobuf2_memops mac80211 ocmem videobuf2_v4l2 libarc4 drm_gpuvm mhi qrtr videodev drm_exec snd_soc_sc8280xp gpu_sched videobuf2_common nvmem_qcom_spmi_sdam snd_soc_qcom_sdw drm_dp_aux_bus qcom_q6v5_pas qcom_spmi_temp_alarm snd_soc_qcom_common rtc_pm8xxx qcom_pon drm_display_helper cec qcom_pil_info qcom_stats soundwire_bus drm_client_lib mc dispcc0_sa8775p videocc_sa8775p qcom_q6v5 camcc_sa8775p snd_soc_dmic phy_qcom_sgmii_eth snd_soc_max98357a i2c_qcom_geni snd_soc_core dwmac_qcom_ethqos llcc_qcom icc_bwmon qcom_sysmon snd_compress qcom_refgen_regulator coresight_stm stmmac_platform snd_pcm_dmaengine qcom_common coresight_tmc stmmac coresight_replicator qcom_glink_smem coresight_cti stm_core [ 48.177444] coresight_funnel snd_pcm ufs_qcom phy_qcom_qmp_usb gpi phy_qcom_snps_femto_v2 coresight phy_qcom_qmp_ufs qcom_wdt gpucc_sa8775p pcs_xpcs mdt_loader qcom_ice icc_osm_l3 qmi_helpers snd_timer snd soundcore display_connector qcom_rng nvmem_reboot_mode drm_kms_helper phy_qcom_qmp_pcie sha256 cfg80211 rfkill socinfo fuse drm backlight ipv6 [ 48.301059] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 293 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-dirty #10 PREEMPT [ 48.310081] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Lemans EVK (DT) [ 48.316782] Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface] [ 48.323672] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 48.330825] pc : mutex_lock+0xc/0x54 [ 48.334514] lr : soc_dapm_shutdown_dapm+0x44/0x174 [snd_soc_core] [ 48.340794] sp : ffff800084ddb7b0 [ 48.344207] x29: ffff800084ddb7b0 x28: ffff00009cd9cf30 x27: ffff00009cd9cc00 [ 48.351544] x26: ffff000099610190 x25: ffffa31d2f19c810 x24: ffffa31d2f185098 [ 48.358869] x23: ffff800084ddb7f8 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 00000000000000d0 [ 48.366198] x20: ffff00009ba6c338 x19: ffff00009ba6c338 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 48.373528] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffa31d4ae6dca8 x15: 072007740775076f [ 48.380853] x14: 0765076d07690774 x13: 00313a323a656369 x12: 767265733a637673 [ 48.388182] x11: 00000000000003f9 x10: ffffa31d4c7dea98 x9 : 0000000000000001 [ 48.395519] x8 : ffff00009a2aadc0 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 48.402854] x5 : 0000000000000 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix divide-by-zero in tipc_sk_filter_connect() A user can set conn_timeout to any value via setsockopt(TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT), including values less than 4. When a SYN is rejected with TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD and the retry path in tipc_sk_filter_connect() executes: delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4); If conn_timeout is in the range [0, 3], the integer division yields 0, and the modulo operation triggers a divide-by-zero exception, causing a kernel oops/panic. Fix this by clamping conn_timeout to a minimum of 4 at the point of use in tipc_sk_filter_connect(). Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: poc-F144 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_filter_rcv (net/tipc/socket.c:2236 net/tipc/socket.c:2362) Call Trace: tipc_sk_backlog_rcv (include/linux/instrumented.h:82 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 include/net/sock.h:2357 net/tipc/socket.c:2406) __release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1185 net/core/sock.c:3213) release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3797) tipc_connect (net/tipc/socket.c:2570) __sys_connect (include/linux/file.h:62 include/linux/file.h:83 net/socket.c:2098)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL pointer dereference when RSU is disabled When the Remote System Update (RSU) isn't enabled in the First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL), the driver encounters a NULL pointer dereference when excute svc_normal_to_secure_thread() thread, resulting in a kernel panic: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 Mem abort info: ... Data abort info: ... [0000000000000008] user address but active_mm is swapper Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: svc_smc_hvc_thr Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8-yocto-standard+ #59 PREEMPT Hardware name: SoCFPGA Stratix 10 SoCDK (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : svc_normal_to_secure_thread+0x38c/0x990 lr : svc_normal_to_secure_thread+0x144/0x990 ... Call trace: svc_normal_to_secure_thread+0x38c/0x990 (P) kthread+0x150/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: 97cfc113 f9400260 aa1403e1 f9400400 (f9400402) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The issue occurs because rsu_send_async_msg() fails when RSU is not enabled in firmware, causing the channel to be freed via stratix10_svc_free_channel(). However, the probe function continues execution and registers svc_normal_to_secure_thread(), which subsequently attempts to access the already-freed channel, triggering the NULL pointer dereference. Fix this by properly cleaning up the async client and returning early on failure, preventing the thread from being used with an invalid channel.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kprobes: avoid crash when rmmod/insmod after ftrace killed After we hit ftrace is killed by some errors, the kernel crash if we remove modules in which kprobe probes. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff805000d PGD 817fcc067 P4D 817fcc067 PUD 817fc8067 PMD 101555067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2012 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W OE Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE RIP: 0010:kprobes_module_callback+0x89/0x790 RSP: 0018:ffff88812e157d30 EFLAGS: 00010a02 RAX: 1ffffffff805000d RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff86a8de90 RDX: ffffed1025c2af9b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffc0280068 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1025c2af9a R10: ffff88812e157cd7 R11: 205d323130325420 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffffffc0290488 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffffffffc0280040 FS: 00007fbc450dd740(0000) GS:ffff888420331000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff805000d CR3: 000000010f624000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> notifier_call_chain+0xc6/0x280 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x32a/0x4e0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xfa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e This is because the kprobe on ftrace does not correctly handles the kprobe_ftrace_disabled flag set by ftrace_kill(). To prevent this error, check kprobe_ftrace_disabled in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and skip all ftrace related operations.