CVE Database
Synced from NVD, cross-referenced against CISA KEV and EPSS · ordered by last update
| CVE ID | Score | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit 26m ago | 3.7 | Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 3.7 | Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk proof containing two TrieProofNode values with identical keys. TrieProof::verify calls TrieProofNode::child_index in primitives/src/trie/trie_proof_node.rs, where is_prefix_of accepts equal keys and KeyNibbles::get is called at the key length, returns None, and is unconditionally unwrapped. Untrusted ResponseChunk data reaches commit_chunks, put_chunk, and proof.verify before cryptographic proof validation, so the attacker does not need a valid proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 5.3 | SQLAdmin is a flexible Admin interface for SQLAlchemy models. Prior to 0.27.1, ModelView.sort_query in sqladmin/models.py accepts the attacker-controlled sortBy list-view query parameter without enforcing the configured column_sortable_list server-side allow-list in self._sort_fields. The value is resolved with getattr and passed to relationship joins and order_by, allowing requests to sort by columns hidden from column_list and by related-model columns through dotted paths. The resulting row order forms an information-exposure oracle for unexposed values, and reversing ascending and descending order confirms their relative ordering. Pairing sortBy with searchable or filterable columns and pagination can narrow the oracle toward specific values, but exact recovery depends on the application's available fields and data. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.1. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 6.6 | ContextForge is an AI gateway, registry, and proxy that provides centralized discovery, guardrails, and management for MCP, A2A, and REST or gRPC APIs. Prior to 1.0.3, the /admin/gateways/test call site in mcpgateway/admin.py calls validate_gateway_test_url() in mcpgateway/common/validators.py to resolve and reject private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata addresses, but ResilientHttpClient later resolves the original hostname again without binding the validated address. When MCPGATEWAY_ADMIN_API_ENABLED is enabled, an attacker with a database-backed role containing explicit gateways.read permission can use DNS rebinding to return a public address during validation and a private or metadata address during connection, bypassing ssrf_blocked_networks and ssrf_dns_fail_closed because those controls apply only to the validation-time result. The endpoint's allow_admin_bypass=False setting means a bootstrap-only virtual platform-admin identity without a database role is not sufficient. Successful exploitation can reach internal services and cloud metadata, expose cloud credentials, access internal APIs, or probe internal network ports. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.3. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 6.4 | Insufficient HTML sanitization in the Publisher Portal and Developer Portal allows untrusted user input to be rendered without proper encoding or neutralization. This enables the injection and execution of malicious JavaScript when affected API documents are viewed. Successful exploitation may result in the execution of malicious scripts within the user's browser context when viewing API documentation. Users with permissions to access the API documentation through these portals may be impacted, potentially allowing attackers to perform actions on behalf of the user, depending on their session privileges. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 7.7 | The OpenTelemetry Operator is a Kubernetes Operator for the OpenTelemetry Collector. Prior to 0.152.0, cmd/otel-allocator TargetAllocator instances with targetAllocator.prometheusCR.enabled set to true preserve a selected ServiceMonitor endpoint's bearerTokenFile value as HTTPClientConfig.Authorization.CredentialsFile. A tenant who can create or update a ServiceMonitor matched by serviceMonitorSelector and serviceMonitorNamespaceSelector can point bearerTokenFile at a file in the Collector pod, including /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token, and direct scraping to a tenant-controlled endpoint. The Collector reads that file at scrape time and sends its contents as bearer authorization on every scrape interval. Exploitation also requires the Collector service-account token or another sensitive file to be mounted and the Collector to reach the chosen target. The DenyFSAccessThroughSMs control was absent, allowing disclosure of the Collector's service-account JWT or other mounted files, and resulting Kubernetes API impact is limited by the Collector service account's permissions. This issue is fixed in version 0.152.0. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 6.8 | gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.13.3, the gix-sec crate on Windows incorrectly treats repositories controlled by another user as trusted when an administrator runs a dependent program with an unfiltered elevated token. In gix-sec/src/identity.rs, gix_sec::identity::is_path_owned_by_current_user obtains folder_owner and token_owner, but its administrator-specific IsWellKnownSid and CheckTokenMembership checks examine the running token rather than confirming the directory owner. This bypasses safe.directory-style protection for repositories owned and configured by a limited user, allowing repository configuration or hooks to execute commands with the administrator's privileges when an affected operation is performed. Exploitation requires Windows, an elevated administrator, a program that relies on gix-sec trust results, and interaction with a repository controlled by another user. An unelevated UAC process is not affected, and cloning is not affected because repository configuration and hooks are not copied. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.3. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 6.3 | A vulnerability was detected in GPAC up to f1219cde. This vulnerability affects the function gf_node_unregister of the file scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c of the component MP4Box. The manipulation results in use after free. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. Upgrading to version abi-16.23 is able to resolve this issue. The patch is identified as 9eb40df4448b88d6a6ce3454657c06f47eff0b24. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 6.3 | A security vulnerability has been detected in a2aproject a2a-python up to 1.1.3. This affects the function _dispatch_notification of the file src/a2a/server/tasks/base_push_notification_sender.py of the component Push Notification Sender. The manipulation of the argument push_info.url leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 1.1.4 is able to mitigate this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 7.3 | A weakness has been identified in itsourcecode Leave Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /login.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument user_email can lead to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. |
| 26m ago | 8.1 | Description Three separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP components served to an authenticated user. The Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also sending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to honour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection. The shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name where an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own defaults, which allow credentials. Finally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET request. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy entirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off. In each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and log data on their behalf. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the CORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to false. Note that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such tooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse proxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and rejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 4.3 | Description The Logviewer offers `logs.users` and `logs.groups` so operators can control who may read log content. For daemon logs those settings were not applied: the access decision combined the "this is a daemon log" flag with the authorizer result in a way that discarded the authorizer's answer whenever the flag was set, and the daemon log page and download endpoints reached the handler without consulting an authorizer at all. Any user able to pass the configured servlet filter could therefore read `nimbus.log`, `supervisor.log` and the other daemon logs on every reachable node, which contain other tenants' topology names, owners and configuration fragments. The same advisory covers the log listing endpoints, which accepted a user argument and never applied it, so `/listLogs` and `/searchLogs` returned every tenant's topology and worker log file names regardless of the caller. That part is metadata only. There was no configuration that closed either behaviour. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the daemon log paths evaluate the same configured user and group lists that the worker log paths already used, and the listing endpoints filter by the requesting user. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the Logviewer behind a reverse proxy that restricts the daemon log endpoints, and should treat daemon log content as readable by any filter-authenticated user. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 9.8 | Description The worker's Netty message decoder is installed ahead of the SASL authentication handlers in the pipeline and acts on frames before any authentication has taken place. It allocated buffers sized from a length field carried in the frame, so a single frame from an unauthenticated peer able to reach a worker slot port could drive a large allocation. `storm.messaging.netty.authentication` defaults to false, and the decoder runs before the handler that enforces it in any case, so no credentials are required. The attacker needs only TCP reachability to a worker port. The effect of a single frame at the default 768 MB worker heap has not been measured to distinguish sustained worker loss from transient garbage-collection pressure. The severity assigned to this advisory reflects the more conservative reading; consumers who require a precise figure should test against their own worker heap configuration. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where frames are decoded only after the handshake completes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that worker slot ports are reachable only from within the cluster, as the security model already recommends, and should enable `storm.messaging.netty.authentication` where the deployment permits it. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 6.5 | Description When ZooKeeper authentication is configured, Storm deliberately retains `storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` in the topology configuration, because workers need it. Nimbus then served that configuration verbatim to any caller holding read-only topology permissions, so a user whose only grant was the ability to view a topology received its ZooKeeper credential. That credential is not read-only. The cluster state implementation uses write-capable ACLs for worker heartbeats, backpressure and error state, so a recipient can forge or remove that state for the topology concerned. It is not a write credential on assignments. The same advisory covers the submission client, which logged the generated payload at INFO on every submission that generated one, and the SASL handlers, which logged it at DEBUG. The credential therefore also reached any log aggregation or support bundle collected from the cluster. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the payload is removed from the configuration served to read-only callers and is no longer written to logs. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should rotate `storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` for existing topologies, review retained logs and support bundles for the value, and restrict read-only topology permissions to trusted principals. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 6.5 | Description `getNimbusConf` returned the complete daemon configuration without redaction after only a user-level authorization check. Where the cluster is configured with them, that response includes `storm.zookeeper.auth.payload` and the keystore and truststore passwords for the Thrift, Netty and ZooKeeper TLS configuration. The project masks passwords elsewhere before display, so the omission here is inconsistent rather than intended. The UI endpoint `/api/v1/cluster/configuration` compounded this. It carried no `@AuthNimbusOp` annotation, and the authorization filter treated a missing annotation as "no gate required" and returned immediately, so the endpoint applied no per-user check at all and proxied the request under the UI daemon's own principal. Any user able to pass `ui.filter` therefore received the full configuration, including principals that Nimbus itself would have refused. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where credential-bearing values are masked before the configuration is served and where every UI API endpoint must declare its authorization explicitly. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI behind an authenticating reverse proxy that restricts `/api/v1/cluster/configuration`, and should rotate the ZooKeeper authentication payload and any TLS keystore or truststore passwords that were reachable through it. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 8.1 | Description Nimbus validated `topology.blobstore.map` against the calling subject at submission time only. The rebalance operation accepts configuration overrides and stripped a small set of keys from them, but never re-ran that validation, so a caller authorised to rebalance a topology could introduce a blobstore map entry naming a blob whose ACL does not grant them access. Supervisors localise whatever key the map names, placing the blob's contents into the topology's working directory. The same advisory covers `listBlobs`, which performed no authorization check and passed no subject, unlike the neighbouring `getBlobMeta` and `beginBlobDownload` operations. It therefore returned every key in the blobstore to any caller able to reach the Nimbus Thrift port, which provides the key names that make the above practical. On its own the disclosure is metadata only. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where rebalance configuration overrides are validated exactly as submission-time configuration is, against the rebalancing caller, and where `listBlobs` applies the configured authorization. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict rebalance rights to trusted principals, keeping in mind that membership of a topology's `topology.users` or `topology.groups` confers them. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 9.8 | Description `SimpleACLAuthorizer` evaluated the user-level command set by returning early when `nimbus.users` was empty, before `nimbus.groups` was considered. An operator who restricted cluster access by group alone, leaving `nimbus.users` unset, therefore received no restriction at all: every authenticated principal was permitted every user-level operation, including `submitTopology`, `beginFileUpload` and `getNimbusConf`. `docs/SECURITY.md` presents `nimbus.groups` as a supported way to lock down a cluster, so a deployment following the documentation could believe it was restricted while it was not. The failure is silent; nothing in the logs or the configuration indicates that the group list is being ignored. Both lists left empty continues to mean that no restriction is configured, which is the shipped default and is unchanged. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where `nimbus.groups` is evaluated whether or not `nimbus.users` is set. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should additionally populate `nimbus.users` with the intended principals, since a non-empty user list causes the group list to be evaluated on affected versions. Operators should review Nimbus access logs for operations by principals outside the intended groups. Note that after upgrading, a cluster configured with `nimbus.groups` alone becomes restrictive for the first time. This includes `NimbusClient`, which calls `getLeader` on every connection, so clients outside the configured groups will begin to be refused. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 7.8 | Description When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents. For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available. For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology submission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 7.8 | Description The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user. A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or `chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing. This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with `supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 8.8 | Description Dependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from the Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical for every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader caught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content or owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved. A user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter of the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another tenant's topology. This affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts` dependency feature is used. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a pre-existing blob is no longer silently reused. Note that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not close this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit existing `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should avoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology jar instead. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 7.8 | Description A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link. A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before they reach Nimbus. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 6.5 | Description Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time. An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator. In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via `nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected. Credit Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept. Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. |
| 26m ago | 4.2 | TripleLift's ad rendering script (video-bundle.js) contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a publisher's domain by sending crafted postMessage payloads without origin validation. Attackers can cause a victim to visit an attacker-controlled page that sends malicious postMessage events to a publisher page running the ad script, enabling session hijacking and unauthorized DOM manipulation. |
| 26m ago | 8.6 | Alior Bank PrestaShop module "raty" for commercial partners is vulnerable to SQL Injection in the "hookActionObjectProductUpdateBefore", "hookActionObjectCategoryUpdateBefore", and "hookActionObjectCategoryAddAfter" hook methods. The module inserts values of the POST parameters "alior_product_promotion", "alior_category_promotion" and "alior_category_enabled" directly into SQL UPDATE queries without any sanitization or validation. An attacker with access to the product or category add/edit functionality in the PrestaShop backoffice can inject arbitrary SQL, potentially allowing unauthorized access to and modification of database contents. This issue was fixed in versions: 9.0.7 and 8.1.11 |
| 26m ago | 7.5 | On affected versions of Zscaler client connector, a pre-installed peer app can tear down the Zscaler tunnel, force user logout, and toggle packet capture. |
| 26m ago | 8.1 | An improper input validation vulnerability in Zscaler Client Connector on Android and ChromeOS allows an attacker to potentially bypass Zscaler controls. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 8.1 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py interpolates LLM-controlled from_addr, subject, and query values directly into quoted IMAP SEARCH criteria. Embedded quote, backslash, newline, or null characters can escape the intended criterion and alter IMAP operations when search_emails, reply_email, or archive_email is exposed to an agent with configured email credentials, allowing mailbox data access, modification, deletion, or connection disruption. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 7.5 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, MentionsParser._process_file_mention accepts file-mention values and falls back from workspace-relative resolution to Path(file_path) without traversal, symlink, or workspace-boundary validation. Prompt input from users, bots, or workflows can therefore read arbitrary files accessible to the process, including credentials, keys, environment files, source code, and system configuration. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 4.3 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, the SSE server in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/server/server.py does not consult ServerConfig.auth_token before handling /publish, /events, or /info requests. A network client that can reach the server can broadcast arbitrary events to connected clients and obtain server configuration and client-count information. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.58. |
| Exploit 26m ago | 8.5 | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, SpiderTools._validate_url calls _host_is_blocked, which checks literal host encodings but does not resolve DNS names before scrape_page, crawl, extract_links, extract_text, or URL-mention fetches connect. An attacker-controlled hostname resolving to a loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore bypasses the SSRF policy without a rebinding race and can expose internal responses to the agent. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.58. |