CVE Database

The base directory (spring.cloud.config.server.svn.basedir) used by the Spring Cloud Config Server to clone SVN repositories to is susceptible to time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) attacks. Spring Cloud Config 5.0.0 - 5.0.4 Spring Cloud Config 4.3.0 - 4.3.4 Spring Cloud Config 4.0.0 - 4.2.8 Spring Cloud Config 3.1.14 and earlier

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Lime Technology, Inc.'s Unraid OS version 6.12.14 and earlier allows remote attackers to escalate privileges via the Unraid authentication cookie's lax same-site policy.

CTFd v3.7.6 was discovered to be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.

Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. In versions prior to 1.2.13, the backend did not validate the handler name submitted through the form postback _handler POST field, allowing an authenticated backend user to invoke arbitrary controller methods, including protected, private, and action-prefixed ones. While AJAX requests validate that handler names match the on[A-Z][\w+]* pattern, the postback path passed the submitted _handler value straight to the handler dispatcher with no such check, so any controller that exposes a public action or conditionally relaxes its $requiredPermissions check could be reached, bypassing the roles and permissions system. The built-in Users controller was affected because it set $requiredPermissions to null for the myaccount action, letting any authenticated backend user invoke user-management methods such as update_onDelete and update_onManualPasswordReset without holding the backend.manage_users permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.13.

Winter is a free, open-source content management system (CMS) based on the Laravel PHP framework. From 1.2.10 through 1.2.12, authenticated backend users with the backend.manage_editor permission can store custom Markup Styles that are compiled by the LESS parser and rendered without sanitization on every backend page, allowing stored cross-site scripting. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.13.

Winter is a free, open-source content management system (CMS) based on the Laravel PHP framework. Prior to 1.2.13, custom CSS supplied through the Brand Settings Styles field by a backend user with the backend.manage_branding permission is compiled by the LESS parser and rendered without sanitization on every backend page, allowing stored cross-site scripting against backend users. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.13.

An issue was discovered in LibreNMS 1.65. A remote authenticated attacker with normal privileges can extract all the information from the LibreNMS database via a SQL injection in the address parameter in the /ajax_table.php API endpoint.

An issue was discovered in LibreNMS 1.65. A remote authenticated attacker with normal privileges can extract all the information from the LibreNMS database via a SQL injection in the sort parameter in the /ajax_table.php API endpoint. This affects address-search.inc.php, alertlog.inc.php, arp-search.inc.php, as-selection.inc.php, bills.inc.php, device_mibs.inc.php, device_oids.inc.php, edit-ports.inc.php, eventlog.inc.php, inventory.inc.php, ix-list.inc.php, ix-peers.inc.php, mempool-edit.inc.php, mempool.inc.php, mibs.inc.php, poll-log.inc.php, processor-edit.inc.php, processor.inc.php, routing-edit.inc.php, sensors-common.inc.php, storage-edit.inc.php, storage.inc.php, tnmsneinfo.inc.php, and toner.inc.php (in includes/html/table).

An issue was discovered in LibreNMS 1.65. A remote authenticated attacker with normal privileges can execute arbitrary shell commands through a command injection in the /graph.php API endpoint.

Stalwart Mail Server does not compare an OAuth redirect target against any registered destination in its default configuration. The validation routine in crates/http/src/auth/oauth/registration.rs returns success immediately when the client-authentication requirement is disabled, and that requirement is false in the shipped settings, so the supplied redirect value is neither matched against a registered client nor otherwise constrained. The value is stored with the authorization code, and the login page reads it back and sends the browser to it with the code attached. A request naming a destination the attacker controls therefore delivers a valid authorization code there once the account holder authenticates, and because the token endpoint checks only that the redirect presented at exchange matches the one recorded with the code, the same party can exchange it for access and refresh tokens and read the account's mail.

Midday allows any member of a team to delete it. The delete procedure in apps/api/src/trpc/routers/team.ts authorises the caller with the team-access helper, which returns true for every row in the team-membership table irrespective of the role it records, and the data-layer function it calls re-checks the same helper and nothing else. The neighbouring procedures that remove or update a member in the same router each resolve the caller's role and refuse the request unless it is owner, so the check exists in the file and is not applied to deletion. Member is the role an invited user receives, so any invitee can remove the team and every record scoped to it, and the deletion enqueues the cleanup job with the stored bank-connection tokens, which the job then uses against the connected providers. The update procedure in the same router carries no role check either.

IDURAR ERP CRM changes the password of whichever account a request names rather than the account making the request. The update handler in backend/src/controllers/middlewaresControllers/createUserController/updatePassword.js resolves the authenticated user from the request that the token middleware populated, then issues its update against a filter built from the identifier in the URL path, and never compares the two. The route is mounted behind the administrator token check only, so any valid administrator session is sufficient, and the sole ownership-like guard in the handler rejects a single hardcoded demo address. A caller can therefore set an arbitrary password on any other administrator account and sign in as it. The read handler in the same controller directory accepts an identifier the same way, which supplies the identifiers needed to pick a target.

OpenMetadata accepts a caller-supplied post-authentication redirect target and appends the issued token to it. SamlLoginServlet reads the callback request parameter and stores it in the HTTP session without comparing it against any configured or registered destination, and the assertion consumer servlet later formats that stored value into a URL carrying the freshly issued JWT together with the account's email and name before sending the redirect. The OIDC and OAuth2 handler follows the same pattern with its own redirect parameter and the issued identity token. A request naming a destination the attacker controls therefore causes the server to deliver a valid token for whoever completes the login to that destination. Because the token authenticates API calls as that account, a user who follows such a link and authenticates hands over control of their account. Version 2.0.0 removes the caller-supplied callback parameter; no 1.x release validates it.

one-api gates one of its two channel-pinning paths and not the other. middleware/auth.go permits a request to name a specific channel either through a suffix on the API key or through a URL path parameter. The suffix path is reached only after model.IsAdmin succeeds and otherwise rejects the caller, while the path-parameter branch sets the selected-channel value from c.Param("channelid") with no role check at all. The route carrying that parameter sits behind token authentication only, so any account holding a valid API token reaches it. The value flows to the distributor, which loads the channel by integer identifier with no scoping to the caller's user or group, and then sets the outbound Authorization header to that channel's stored key and directs the request at the channel's base URL. A low-privilege account can therefore pin any channel by incrementing an identifier, causing the server to make upstream requests bearing an operator-configured provider key the account was never granted, and bypassing both the per-group restriction and the channel's model allowlist.

bestzip builds the argument list for the system zip utility without separating options from operands. The destination archive path and the caller-supplied source paths are passed to the child process with no -- delimiter between them, so any source entry beginning with a hyphen is interpreted by zip as an option rather than a file name. zip accepts -T to test the finished archive and -TT to name the command used to perform that test, so a source list containing those two entries and a command string causes zip to run that command through a shell once the archive has been written. An application that passes a file name or path it received from an untrusted source into the bestzip API therefore executes a command of the supplier's choosing. Versions 2.2.6 and 3.0.2 add the delimiter.

FiftyOne renders a dataset field's description as markup. The sidebar field-information component at app/packages/core/src/components/FieldLabelAndInfo/index.tsx passes the description string to React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML, and no layer between storage and render escapes or sanitises it; the neighbouring info values in the same component are rendered as React children and are escaped, so the description is the only raw path. A description is free-form text held in the dataset schema, so it persists in the database and travels with an exported or published dataset. Opening a dataset obtained from another party and hovering the field runs the stored markup in the application's origin. That origin is shared with the FiftyOne server, whose media route returns the contents of a caller-named absolute path and which is unauthenticated in the open-source server, so the injected script can read local files and reach the dataset and operator endpoints as the viewing user.

SunEditor is a lightweight and powerful WYSIWYG editor in vanilla JavaScript with no dependencies. Prior to 3.1.4, the SunEditor Embed plugin in src/plugins/modal/embed.js parses attacker-controlled raw embed HTML with DOMParser and processes the resulting DOM nodes. When an external script element follows a valid iframe, the plugin recreates a script element from the attacker-controlled src attribute and appends it to the live DOM, causing JavaScript execution in the editor page. If an application stores or reflects SunEditor content without additional backend sanitization, an attacker who can submit embed HTML can trigger stored or reflected cross-site scripting when another user opens, previews, renders, or edits the content, enabling access to page data and account actions as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.4.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: reclaim forward-allocated memory on RX path errors After commit 9db5b3cec4ec ("mptcp: borrow forward memory from subflow"), errors in the receive path prior to queueing skbs into the receive queue do not trigger forward-allocated memory reclaiming. Prevent forward memory from growing unboundedly in pathological drop scenarios by explicitly reclaiming memory when skbs are dropped.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/qeth: validate user buffer length in SNMP and ARP query ioctls qeth_snmp_command() and qeth_l3_arp_query() allocate a buffer sized by a user-supplied length (udata_len) without checking a lower bound, then set udata_offset to a fixed non-zero value and pass both to a reply callback. The callback bounds-checks the copy with if ((udata_len - udata_offset) < len) Both fields are u32, so a udata_len smaller than udata_offset makes the subtraction wrap and the check pass, and the following memcpy() writes past the allocation. A udata_len of 0 also yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR from kzalloc(), which the existing NULL check does not catch. Reject buffers smaller than udata_offset before allocating, so the callback subtraction can no longer underflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL: snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/shmem_helper: Check VMA boundaries for PMD mappings In the ->huge_fault handler do not install a PMD huge page mapping if the huge page exceeds the boundaries of the VMA. All other ->huge_fault handlers have similar checks and the resulting mapping will trigger a VM_BUG_ON_VMA() if it ever reaches copy_pmd_range().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: bound mode sysfs output to the sysfs buffer mode_string() uses snprintf() which can return a value larger than the remaining buffer space. show_modes() accumulates the return value into i without checking whether i has reached PAGE_SIZE, causing the offset to advance past the sysfs buffer if the modelist is long enough. Add a size parameter to mode_string() and use scnprintf() to return only the bytes actually written. Add an early return when offset already exceeds the buffer. In show_modes(), stop accumulating once the buffer is full.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: clear fb_info->mode before deleting a videomode fb_set_var() can delete a mode from info->modelist when userspace passes FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE through FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO. The code checks that the mode being deleted is not the current info->var and that fbcon is not using it, but it does not check fb_info->mode. fb_info->mode may still point into the modelist entry being deleted. If the entry is freed, later mode sysfs reads through show_mode() can dereference a stale pointer. Clear fb_info->mode before calling fb_delete_videomode() when it matches the mode being removed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: core: Fix pointer desynchronization in fb_io_read() In fb_io_read(), if copy_to_user() performs a partial copy (e.g., due to a faulty user buffer), the loop adjusts the chunk size 'c' and updates the remaining 'count'. However, the hardware 'src' pointer has already been eagerly advanced by the original chunk size. If the loop is allowed to continue, the read will resume from an incorrect, over-advanced offset. Since the remaining 'count' was only decremented by the successful bytes, this desynchronization causes the next iterations to execute more hardware reads than originally bounded, eventually leading to out-of-bounds I/O reads. Fix this by breaking out of the loop immediately upon a partial copy_to_user(). A partial copy indicates a faulty user buffer, making subsequent read attempts futile. Breaking out ensures we return the number of successfully read bytes without risking out-of-bounds hardware accesses in subsequent mismatched iterations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits On GFX rings, amdgpu_cs_p2_ib() passed user-supplied ib_bytes through to ib->length_dw without a limit, while ring_emit_ib() encodes length into packet fields. Oversized values can corrupt adjacent control bits and destabilize command submission. Add a per-ring IB packet size limit helper and reject command submissions exceeding the corresponding dword limit before IB allocation. Use the documented 20-bit limit for GFX/compute/SDMA/VPE, and apply the MM fallback limit for other ring types. (cherry picked from commit 7f48fa2cf62e3fa6c9c3870aa74988f773247e52)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything: work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data, periodic->custom_len, sizeof(s16)); work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled: - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it. - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it: base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index; max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index; Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: focaltech - fix array out-of-bounds in focaltech_process_rel_packet Make finger2 (and also finger1) unsigned, so that if the finger index in the packet is 0 then subtracting 1 creates an array index which overflows above the existing check for FOC_MAX_FINGERS, as the existing comment says it should, instead of writing to state->fingers[-1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while the disconnect is in progress. Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error In rmi_f54_work(), if an error occurs during report request or command verification, the code jumped directly to the 'error' label, bypassing the 'abort' label where f54->report_size was normally zeroed out. This left f54->report_size containing its previous successful payload size. If a user then altered the V4L2 format to a smaller size, and a subsequent run failed, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() would copy the stale, larger payload size into the shrunken V4L2 buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. Fix this by merging the 'abort' and 'error' labels into a single 'out' exit path, and ensuring that f54->report_size is always set to 0 on failure by checking for error and zeroing the local report_size first.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F54 report size to the allocated buffer rmi_f54_work() reads a diagnostics report from the device into f54->report_data, sizing the transfer with rmi_f54_get_report_size(): report_size = rmi_f54_get_report_size(f54); ... for (i = 0; i < report_size; i += F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE) { int size = min(F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE, report_size - i); ... rmi_read_block(.., f54->report_data + i, size); } report_data is allocated once at probe from F54's own electrode counts (array3_size(f54->num_tx_electrodes, f54->num_rx_electrodes, sizeof(u16))), but rmi_f54_get_report_size() computes the size from drv_data->num_*_electrodes when those are set, i.e. from the F55 function's electrode counts. Both counts come straight from device queries (F54 and F55 each report up to 255 electrodes) and nothing constrains the F55 counts to the F54 ones. A malicious or malfunctioning RMI4 device that reports larger F55 electrode counts than its F54 counts makes report_size exceed the allocation, so the read loop writes past report_data (and the V4L2 dequeue memcpy() then reads past it). On conforming hardware the F55 configured electrodes are a subset of the F54 physical electrodes, so report_size never exceeds the buffer and well-behaved devices are unaffected. Record the allocation size and reject a report that does not fit, mirroring the existing zero-size check.